

SUBJECT: The August Meeting in Zimbabwe: US Vulnerabilities and Possible Responses [REDACTED]

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DATE 6/10/86 FILE

DOC NO GI M 86-20139

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

3 June 1986

The August NAM Meeting In Zimbabwe:
US Vulnerabilities and Possible Responses

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Summary

The harshly anti-American tone of the April ministerial level meeting of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) suggests that the level of anti-US rhetoric at the summit scheduled for 26 August to 7 September in Harare will be substantial, probably exceeding that of previous summits. NAM political dynamics and the extensive material support by Cuba and other radicals to Zimbabwe for the meeting will work against efforts to limit anti-US posturing. Moscow almost certainly will not be disappointed with NAM rhetoric on South Africa, disarmament, and Central America as its views are similar to those of many Nonaligned members. The Soviets are well positioned to capitalize on the NAM meeting -- with proven support among radical NAM members and an "active measures" capability in Zimbabwe. Nonetheless, US public diplomacy could help minimize the inevitable political fallout. Potentially useful tactics include: exposure of Soviet and Cuban efforts to manipulate the NAM, preemptive deflation of the meeting's inevitable anti-US pronouncements, publicity for the views of NAM moderates, and challenge of the Nonaligned credentials of Soviet client states.

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This memorandum was prepared by [] Subversion Analysis Branch, Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Foreign Subversion and Instability Center, []

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Background

From 26 August to 7 September approximately 5,000 to 7,000 people, including 101 heads of state, will converge in Harare, Zimbabwe for the Eighth Nonaligned Movement (NAM) Summit. Prime Minister Mugabe succeeds India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Harare was persuaded by Havana last year to accept the NAM chairmanship, giving Zimbabwe only 16 months to prepare for the meeting. Mugabe probably believed that the NAM chairmanship would enhance his credentials as a Third World leader, establish Zimbabwe as a key country among the "Frontline" states, and focus greater world attention on southern Africa.

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As host of the Nonaligned summit, Zimbabwe is responsible for authoring a working document prior to the meeting, a draft of which will probably be circulated among NAM members at the UN in New York soon. Positions on many issues -- for example, South Africa's apartheid -- have changed only slightly since the late 1970s.

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Strong Criticism of the US Expected

Based upon the NAM's long track record and the strong anti-US hostility expressed at the recent NAM Foreign Ministers' meeting in New Delhi, we expect that the draft and final NAM communique will be strongly anti-US in tone.

- o The final document from the New Delhi meeting criticizes the United States by name more than any previous NAM document. We believe that most, if not all, of the critical references to the United States will be incorporated into the Harare NAM draft.
- o Eliminating strong anti-US language from the draft will be difficult. Although NAM members seldom have difficulty in adding new items to a draft, deleting language established in previous documents is difficult. For example, at the foreign ministers' meeting in April, India tried to draft a more moderate document, but radical members' insistence on adherence to previously agreed upon language and the US attack on Tripoli on the eve of the meeting prevented the adoption of a more moderate document.

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Moreover, Zimbabwe's financial difficulties in hosting the conference make it vulnerable to pressure from radical NAM members. The US \$40 million reportedly budgeted for the summit represents a substantial strain on an economy facing slow economic growth (2-3 percent), a large budget deficit (more than 10 percent of GDP), and inflation projected to reach 20 percent this year. To limit the strain, Zimbabwe is accepting contributions from other countries (see appendix for a listing). In our view, Harare's ineptitude in negotiating deals with a number of potential contributors is likely to allow more committed radical members -- most notably Cuba -- to provide desperately needed services and equipment for the summit. [REDACTED]

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Cuba's past track record in the NAM suggests that it will exploit this position to good effect. During previous summits, Cuba has lobbied effectively for a variety of pro-Soviet positions -- for example, on Afghanistan and Cambodia -- forcing moderate NAM members to compromise more than they would like to for fear of harming NAM unity. [REDACTED]

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Anticipated NAM Agenda

Final documents for all NAM meetings contain two sections: economic and political. We expect that the economic section of the Harare communique will replay the usual litany of Third World demands -- for example, establishment of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and treatment of natural resources such as Antarctica as the "common heritage of all mankind." Because NAM members usually avoid commenting on problems among the Nonaligned, both the economic and political sections can be expected to concentrate on the policies of non-members. Besides the United States, South Africa and Israel are frequent targets of NAM resolutions; occasionally NAM rhetoric also targets Western allies such as France and Great Britain. [REDACTED]

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Evidence to date suggests that several issues are likely to get high priority in Harare:

- o Southern Africa. We believe that southern African issues will probably have the highest priority at the meeting. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] delegates will probably call for economic and political sanctions and that South Africa will be condemned for its activities in support of UNITA in Angola. In addition, there are indications that some members may replay the idea that the US attack on Libya created the atmosphere for recent South African attacks on Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

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- o Disarmament. We expect that the summit will endorse the arms control initiative of the Group of Six -- Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden, and Tanzania -- for a US-Soviet test ban with the Group providing verification assistance. We also think that the communique, which will probably replay the April New Delhi meeting's praise for Gorbachev's arms control proposals, may also attack recent US decisions regarding SALT.
- o LDC Economic Problems. Re-energizing the Nonaligned approach to global economic problems -- particularly LDC debt and the NIEO -- will also be an important agenda item. While some NAM members oppose the proposal because of fears that it will split the Group of 77 (G-77), India is seeking the establishment of a standing committee on economic issues whose function would be to create a NAM position vis a vis international economic conferences and organizations.
- o NAM Chairmanship. Selection of the next NAM chairman will be decided in Harare, with the primary contenders being Argentina, Nicaragua, Peru, Yugoslavia, and Indonesia. While to date only Nicaragua has formally announced its candidacy, we believe that Peru's President Garcia is the strongest contender. Many members believe it is Latin America's turn to head the movement and Peru has the support of key moderates such as Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia. In our judgment, should there be difficulty in reaching a consensus for Peru, Yugoslavia could be a compromise choice. [redacted]

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Soviet Exploitation of the Harare Meeting

The Soviets will almost certainly not be disappointed with NAM rhetoric on South Africa, disarmament, and Central America as their views are similar to those of many of the Nonaligned. On some issues, like Afghanistan, Soviet allies -- for example, the Cubans and Nicaraguans -- will block efforts to single out Moscow for criticism. [redacted]

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In addition to the support that Moscow can expect from its allies, the Soviet Union, in our view, is positioned to influence and exploit the Harare Summit through its own means. Although officially limited to 32 diplomatic personnel, Moscow has over 50 nationals in Zimbabwe. [redacted]

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The Soviets are likely to use several means to try to influence the meeting and exploit it for propaganda purposes.

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The Soviets are also likely to use the Third World press, particularly media within Zimbabwe, to create the right climate of opinion for the meeting by planting articles critical of US foreign policy, particularly US policy toward South Africa.

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US Prospects for Influencing the NAM

In our view, the prospects for positive US influence at the NAM meeting are slim. While US representations to individual members could restrain some from contributing to anti-US debate or agreeing to language criticizing the United States by name, the radicals -- for example, Cuba, Libya and Nicaragua -- have little to lose by attacking the United States. Other members are probably willing to risk offending the United States, believing that we will not jeopardize relations over NAM rhetoric. Moreover, consensus procedures in the NAM make it difficult for even sympathetic countries to thwart radical initiatives without dividing NAM unity. [REDACTED]

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The tactics used by other non-member countries to deal with the NAM offer few lessons. Countries such as China, Sweden, and West Germany provide support -- including overt financial assistance -- to protect their interests. But, because the United States has consistently been a major NAM target, direct US efforts would be viewed with suspicion and it is unlikely that moderate NAM members would be willing to channel assistance to the NAM on our behalf. Other countries -- such as Albania, Burma, and Paraguay -- deal with the NAM by totally ignoring it. Unfortunately, since one major NAM objective is to provoke US action on LDC demands, studious inattention to the NAM by the United States is only likely to provoke greater NAM efforts. [REDACTED]

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Appendix
Aid To Zimbabwe for the Summit

Aid ExtensionsCountryAid Accepted

Algeria	US\$ 1 million; Arabic, French and English translators
Cuba	Unspecified number of villas; French, English and Spanish translators, plus airfare and salaries; 200-300 technicians (typists, publishers, and translators)
France	200 Peugeot 504s
Greece	US\$ 1.5 million; free shipment of construction equipment for villas; foodstuffs
India	Five luxury buses
Iran	Carpets and stoves; 10 mini-buses; 10 language and international organization specialists
North Korea	US\$ 500,000
PLO	Motorcycles
Sweden	US\$ 715,000 for telecommunications equipment
West Germany	Office equipment

Aid Offers Being NegotiatedCountryOffer

Cuba	1,000-man security force; intelligence training
East Germany	Automobiles
Egypt	Security equipment; personnel
Gulf States	110 Mercedes automobiles
Iran	Buses
Italy	Airport radar
Turkey	Villa construction